Two-Sided Uncertainty and "Up-or-Out" Contracts
用双边道德风险模型解释“要么晋升要么出局”雇佣合同：雇主设定高于机会成本的工资激励员工进行企业专用投资，若员工不达标则事后解雇，否则雇主会低估员工价值破坏激励机制。模型允许双方风险中性，并拓展到多期。
A bilateral moral-hazard problem provides a rationale for "up-or-ou t" employment contracts. The employer sets a wage higher than opportunit y cost to induce the worker to invest in firm-specific capital. If the individual does not make the grade, it is in the firm's interest ex post to fire him. Had the initial arrangement not included provisions for firing individuals, the firm would underreport the value of the employee, wrecking the incentive scheme. The basic model permits both firm and worker to be risk neutral. Therefore, it admits a straightforward multiperiod extension, which the authors also investi gate. Copyright 1988 by University of Chicago Press.