Anonymity and Optimality of Competitive Equilibria when Markets Are Incomplete
研究市场不完全时竞争均衡的效率，发现若社会规划者只能依据统计信息且不能直接观察消费者类型，则竞争均衡可能是匿名约束最优的，这与完全可观察类型时的普遍次优性不同。
We study the optimality, or efficiency, of competitive equilibria in a standard two period economy where markets are incomplete. Statistical information about consumers′ preferences and endowments is known to a social planner, but the planner cannot observe consumers′ types directly. A competitive equilibrium is anonymous constrained optimal if the social planner cannot Pareto improve upon the equilibrium allocation by intervening in asset markets with any asset trade rule satisfying anonymity. In some cases, a competitive equilibrium is robustly anonymous constrained optimal, whereas it is known that competitive equilibria are generically constrained suboptimal for the case of completely observable types. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D82, H21.