The political economy of farmland ownership regulations and land prices
用政治经济学框架解释加拿大萨斯喀彻温省《农场安全法》的出台原因，并估计该法对农田价值的影响，发现管制越严格，土地价值越低，平均每英亩降低4到34美元。
Abstract One of the most ubiquitous forms of agricultural regulation is a restriction on farmland ownership. One Canadian example of a farmland ownership restriction is The Saskatchewan Farm Security Act (FSA), passed in 1974. The purpose of this article is to explain, using a political economy framework, why the FSA was implemented and to estimate the effect of the FSA on Saskatchewan farmland values. A Present Value (PV) model is used to estimate the relationship between land values, rents, and the regulation. The Hausman endogeneity test reveals that the regulation variable is endogenous with the land price. The sign of the regulation variable is negative, which fits with the theory, i.e., the more stringent the regulation the lower the land value. We estimate that the regulation lowered Saskatchewan farmland prices by an average of 4 to 34 US$/acre, depending on whether ordinary least squares (OLS) or two‐stage least squares (TSLS) is employed in the estimation, over the period of 1974–2001.