Do Relationships Matter? Evidence from Loan Officer Turnover
研究发现，依赖分散知识和个人关系的企业中，员工离职成本取决于企业规划期和离职员工的信息传递激励。信贷员离职后，借款人更难获得新贷款、更可能转向其他银行或违约，但预期内离职或自愿离职时成本较小。
We show that the cost of employee turnover in firms that rely on decentralized knowledge and personal relationships depends on the firms' planning horizons and the departing employees' incentives to transfer information. Using exogenous shocks to the relationship between borrowers and loan officers, we document that borrowers whose loan officers are on leave are less likely to receive new loans from the bank, are more likely to apply for credit from other banks, and are more likely to miss payments or go into default. These costs are smaller when turnover is expected, as in the case of maternity leave, or when loan officers have incentives to transfer information, as in the case of voluntary resignations. This paper was accepted by Wei Jiang, finance.