Games Parents and Adolescents Play: Risky Behaviour, Parental Reputation and Strategic Transfers
构建重复博弈模型，分析父母如何通过惩罚年长子女的青少年冒险行为（如辍学、少女怀孕）来建立声誉，以威慑年幼子女。实证支持该声誉模型。
This paper examines parental reputation formation in intra-familial interactions. In a repeated two-stage game, children decide whether to drop out of high school or daughters decide whether to have births as teens and parents then decide whether to provide support to their children beyond age 18. Drawing on Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Kreps and Wilson (1982), we show that, under certain conditions, parents have the incentive to penalize older children for their adolescent risk-taking behaviours in order to dissuade their younger children from such behaviours when reaching adolescence. We find evidence in favour of this parental reputation model.