Managerial Influences on Intraorganizational Information Technology Use: A Principal‐Agent Model
基于委托-代理理论，研究了管理者如何通过激励和控制（如监督、多期合同）影响组织成员使用新信息技术，并通过实验验证了这些机制的有效性取决于用户对激励和控制形式的辨别能力。
ABSTRACT Our current understanding of information technology (IT) usage does not explain why and how managers can influence organizational members to use a new IT. Drawing on principal‐agent research, this paper develops and tests a model of intraorganizational IT usage that addresses this important issue. Managerial incentives and control are examined as important components of managerial influences, which are linked to IT usage via a principal‐agent model (PAM). Seven research hypotheses are generated from this model and empirically tested using a laboratory experiment. Results of the study indicate that managers can promote IT usage within organizations by designing appropriate incentives and control structures such as monitoring and multiple‐period contracts. However, the effectiveness of these structures will depend on potential users' ability to distinguish between various forms of incentives and control.