Insurer pricing and consumer welfare: evidence from Medigap
研究了补充医疗保险市场中不完全竞争对消费者福利的影响，发现低价格弹性和品牌偏好导致保险公司高价营销，市场表现不佳。
This article examines the welfare impact of imperfect competition in the Medicare supplement insurance (Medigap) market. Two firms control nearly three fourths of the Medigap market, and premiums exceed claims by over 25%. I find that a low price elasticity and consumers' brand preferences lead firms to engage in substantial marketing and price above cost. Therefore, the strategic behavior of insurers facing relatively inelastic demand is critical in explaining poor market performance. I also find that insurers do not capture all of the rents in this market; rents also accrue to actors who perform marketing functions, including agents and brokers.