Moral Hazard in Leasing Contracts: Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry
研究纽约市出租车长期租赁司机与车主司机的驾驶表现，发现道德风险显著导致租赁司机更多事故、违规和车辆检查不合格，并通过工具变量和面板数据分析处理合同选择的内生性。
In this study, I investigate the effects of moral hazard in leasing contracts by examining the driving outcomes of all long-term lessees and owner-operators of New York City taxis. I find that moral hazard explains a sizable fraction of lessees’ accidents, driving violations, and vehicle inspection failures. To address the possibility of endogenous contract choice, I conduct an instrumental variables analysis of the cross section of all drivers and a panel-data analysis of a subset of drivers who switched from leasing to owning.