Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School
通过随机实验和结构模型，检验监控和金钱激励能否减少印度教师缺勤并提高学生学习成绩。实验组教师缺勤率下降21个百分点，学生测试分数提高0.17个标准差。
We use a randomized experiment and a structural model to test whether monitoring and financial incentives can reduce teacher absence and increase learning in India. In treatment schools, teachers' attendance was monitored daily using cameras, and their salaries were made a nonlinear function of attendance. Teacher absenteeism in the treatment group fell by 21 percentage points relative to the control group, and the children's test scores increased by 0.17 standard deviations. We estimate a structural dynamic labor supply model and find that teachers respond strongly to financial incentives. Our model is used to compute cost-minimizing compensation policies.