Did the Airline Tariff Publishing Case Reduce Collusion?
研究美国司法部1992年对八家航空公司和ATP公司的诉讼及其和解对行业的影响，发现价格在调查期间下降但和解后上升，合谋仅受暂时抑制。
In December 1992, the U.S. Department of Justice filed suit against eight major domestic airlines and the Airline Tariff Publishing (ATP) Company in order to reduce opportunities for collusion in the industry. The lawsuit ended with consent decrees limiting the ability of airlines to communicate surreptitiously through the shared fare database. This paper measures the effects of the litigation and its settlement on industry performance, comparing changes in outcomes between market segments that were more and less likely to be affected by the ATP case. Prices fell in response to the investigation but increased following the settlement, while the number of tickets sold in affected markets declined. The importance of multimarket contact also declined and then recovered. The ATP case had at best a temporary effect on airline collusion.