The Design of Multidimensional Auctions
研究采购拍卖中企业成本相关时的最优机制设计，发现与独立成本模型不同，最优结果需通过两阶段拍卖实现：先选一家企业，再谈判调整质量水平。
Procurement auctions usually require the bid to specify several characteristics of the contract to be fulfilled. In this article I study the design of such mechanisms, allowing for a special case of correlation of the firm's costs. I describe the properties of optimal mechanisms and study the design of multidimensional auctions. Contrary to the independent-costs model, to implement the optimal outcome the procurer will need to use a two-stage auction: in the first stage the procurer selects one firm; in the second stage he bargains to readjust the level of quality to be provided.