Building Perceived Quality of Founder–Involved IPO Firms: Founders’ Effects on Board Selection and Stock Market Performance
研究了创始人声望如何影响IPO公司内部和外部董事的选择，以及这些选择如何影响短期市场表现（IPO抑价），发现创始人声望与董事声望正相关，但内外董事声望存在替代关系，高管的外部董事会经验能降低抑价。
Research on governance has focused on large corporations, giving far less attention to smaller and younger companies especially those moving from founder–controlled start–ups to professionally managed public companies. Emphasizing founder–involved firms (i.e., firms that are floated by their original founders), this article examines interlinks between founders’ prestige and selection of inside and outside directors, and short–term performance measured in terms of IPO “underpricing.” The results provide evidence of positive association between founders’ and directors’ prestige, but there is substitution between inside and outside directors’ prestige. Top management team's external board experiences reduce IPO underpricing.