Sovereign risk exposure with potential liquidation: the performance of alternative forms of external finance
构建了一个国际投资模型，发现外国直接投资者可通过清算规避东道国政府的歧视性待遇，而外国债务持有人因同等优先权限制无法如此操作，从而预测FDI占比与主权风险正相关，并用52个发展中国家的数据验证了这一结论。
This paper develops a model of international investment where direct foreign investors have the ability to escape discriminatory treatment from the host country government by liquidating to a domestic entrepreneur. A similar ‘liquidating option’ does not exist for holders of foreign debt obligations, however, because of equal seniority restrictions. We show that under weak parameter restrictions, the ability to liquidate implies that the share of FDI in the inward investment portfolio of a nation will be positively correlated with that nation's perceived sovereign risk. This prediction is supported in empirical tests using two indicators of sovereign risk for 52 developing countries..