Quality Leadership when Regulatory Standards are Forthcoming
研究在政府即将设定最低质量标准时，高质量企业提前承诺质量水平会诱使监管者降低标准，导致社会福利下降，质疑企业自我监管的社会效益。
In many markets, governments set minimum quality standards while some sellers compete on the basis of quality by exceeding them. Such quality leadership strategies often win public acclaim, especially when they involve environmental attributes. Using a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation, we show that if the high‐quality firm can commit to a quality level before regulations are promulgated, it induces the regulator to weaken standards, and welfare falls. Our results raise doubts about the social benefits of corporate self‐regulation, and highlight the dangers of lengthy delays between legislative mandates for new regulations and their implementation.