Search Intensity in Oligopoly
研究了一个同时定价的寡头博弈，其中买家拥有不同的价格信息。发现市场中的额外价格信息对价格的影响不同，只有当信息匮乏的买家被触及时，平均价格才会下降。
A simultaneous price-setting oligopoly game characterized by the existence of buyers with differing price information is presented. The information structure of the game is more general than previously considered, thereby permitting a richer analysis. In addition to identifying the general conditions that lead to equilibrium with price dispersion, the author provides a revealing reinterpretation of models characterized by simpler information structures. An important finding of the paper is that additional price information in the market impacts prices differently. Only if the poorly informed buyers are reached can we expect average prices to decrease. Copyright 1996 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.