Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?
维克里拍卖理论上高效，但现实中很少见。本文认为，对作弊的担忧以及缺乏激励让竞拍者如实出价是主要原因，并建模分析了第三方攫取部分经济租金的影响。
In 1961, William Vickrey showed that, in an independent private-values context with symmetric risk-neutral bidders, sealed second-price auctions have dominant truth-revealing equilibrium strategies; are perfectly efficient economically; and produce the same expected revenue for bid takers as equilibrium strategies in oral progressive auctions, Dutch auctions, or standard, first-price sealed bidding. Yet sealed second-price auctions seldom occur. The authors argue that fear of cheating and especially disincentives for bidders to follow truth-revealing strategies are important explanations. They model auctions in which third parties capture a fraction of the economic rent revealed by the second-price procedure. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.