Why do firms make and buy? Efficiency, appropriability and competition in the trucking industry
研究了卡车运输企业为何同时使用员工司机和外包司机，发现效率、专有性和竞争因素驱动了这种按趟次组织的混合治理模式。
Most literature examining firms’ make and buy decisions fails to explore when firms use both governance structures for similar transactions. We examine this phenomenon in the trucking industry, where it is common for a carrier to use both employee drivers and outsourcing at the same time. We argue that efficiency, appropriability and competition concerns lead carriers to organize on a haul-by-haul basis.We empirically examine our theory using a unique data from a small trucking firm in St Louis, MO, and find broad support for our hypotheses.We also discuss the possibility of alternative explanations of market power, capacity constraint, agency theory and property right theory for the use of make and buy. We conclude that these theories do not explain this phenomenon in the trucking industry. Thus, we conclude that it is the interaction of efficiency, appropriability and competition concerns that drive the decision to make and buy in the trucking industry.We further postulate that these concerns can manifest themselves in other industries, suggesting that our theory has applicability beyond trucking.