Optimal Retail Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard
研究制造商与经销商签约时，经销商私下知晓需求且其促销努力不可观测，推导出最优零售合同通常包含转售价格维持和数量限制，并分析价格与数量如何影响销售与促销的关联。
Constrained joint-profit-maximizing retail contracts are derived when the dealer is privately informed about demand conditions before contracting with the manufacturer. Demand is increased by dealer promotion, which is unobservable by the manufacturer. Consequently, the manufacturer does not know whether to attribute a low level of sales to a decline in demand or to a lack of promotion. We show that, in general, the optimal contract exhibits some form of resale price maintenance and quantity fixing. The type of resale price maintenance and quantity fixing depends on how price and quantity affect the link between sales and promotion.