The Pricing of Initial Public Offerings: Tests of Adverse-Selection and Signaling Theories
检验了多个IPO抑价模型，发现投资者无需与知情者竞争时IPO不会抑价，且声誉好的承销商承销的IPO抑价更少、长期表现更好，但未支持信号模型。
We test the empirical implications of several models of IPO underpricing. Consistent with the winner's-curse hypothesis, we show that in markets where investors know a priori that they do not have to compete with informed investors, IPOs are not underpriced. We also show that IPOs underwritten by reputable investment banks experience significantly less underpricing and perform significantly better in the long run. We do not find empirical support for the signaling models that try to explain why firms underprice. In fact, we find that (1) firms that underprice more return to the reissue market less frequently, and for lesser amounts, than firms that underprice less, and (2) firms that underprice less experience higher earnings and pay higher dividends, contrary to the models' predictions.