Monetary Policy Rules, Policy Preferences, and Uncertainty: Recent Empirical Evidence
综述了货币政策规则的最新经验证据，发现政治经济学文献强调的制度设计（如央行独立性和通胀目标制）作用被夸大，制度变革既非必要也非充分条件，但某些案例（如英国）中政策转变明显。
We survey recent empirical evidence on monetary policy rules, and find that the emphasis in the political economy literature on institutional design (e.g. central bank independence and inflation targeting) is exaggerated. Formal institutional reform seems neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the observation of shifts in monetary policy rules. However, there is no doubt that in some cases (e.g. the UK following the start of inflation targeting in 1992, and Bank of England Independence in 1997), a major shift in monetary policy conduct is detectable. We also highlight the problems in explicitly testing the predictions of the political economy literature. Semi‐structural modelling approaches, such as time‐varying VAR models may be more useful in understanding policy rules, and the interaction between policy shifts and changes in the transmission mechanism.