Markets as Constraints: Multilateral Incentive Compatibility in Continuum Economies
研究连续经济体中的多边激励相容性，发现可交换商品的市场价格和预算集约束是防止私人信息代理人联合操纵的必要条件，对理解市场在信息不对称下的效率有重要意义。
A symmetric allocation in a continuum is "multilaterally incentive compatible" if no finite coalition of privately informed agents can manipulate it by combining deception with hidden trades of exchangeable goods. Sufficient conditions for multilateral compatibility are that all agents face the same linear prices for exchangeable goods, and that indistinguishable agents face identical budget sets. The same conditions are necessary under assumptions which extend those under which the second efficiency theorem of welfare economics holds in a continuum economy. Markets for exchangeable goods emerge as binding constraints on the set of Pareto efficient allocations with private information.