The Dampening-of-Competition Effect of Exclusive Dealing
运用竞争抑制方法分析纵向关系，发现在没有品牌内零售商竞争时，企业通过独家交易能获得更高利润，并解释了独家交易与独家区域同时出现的现象，最后用结果重新审视了1949年标准加油站案。
Using the dampening-of-competition approach to understanding vertical relationships, this paper shows that, in the absence of intrabrand retailer competition, firms earn greater profits using exclusive dealing. The paper explains the frequent simultaneous appearance of exclusive dealing and exclusive territoriality. The results are used to analyze the famous 1949 Standard Stations case. The author concludes that the 1949 Court did the right thing for a wrong reason. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.