Information Revelation in Repeated Delegation
研究两期重复委托模型，代理人通过第一期政策选择向委托人传递自身偏好类型；当效用函数非严格凹时，可能出现低声誉类型反而更受委托人青睐的均衡结果。
In a two-period model of repeated delegation with asymmetric information, the policy that is implemented during the first period is used by the delegate to signal his most preferred policy (his type) to the principal. When the utility functions are strictly concave, the set of types who implement a given policy is an interval. Otherwise, there exist equilibrium outcomes in which types have a lower reputation, at the beginning of the second period, than other types, even if the former types are better than the latter from the principal′s point of view. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D72, D82.