Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect
研究印度就业保障计划中法定工资上涨如何通过“金鹅效应”减少腐败，发现预期未来租金能显著抑制盗窃行为，使工资上涨对盗窃的总影响减少约64%。
Theoretical work on disciplining corrupt agents has emphasized the role of expected future rents—for example, efficiency wages. Yet taken seriously this approach implies that illicit future rents should also deter corruption. We study this “golden goose” effect in the context of a statutory wage increase in India's employment guarantee scheme, comparing official microrecords to original household survey data to measure corruption. We estimate large golden goose effects that reduced the total impact of the wage increase on theft by roughly 64 percent. In short, rent expectations matter.