工资不确定条件下的最优工资税和所得税

Optimal Wage and Income Taxation with Wage Uncertainty

International Economic Review · 1987
被引 73
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

分析了一个两期模型,其中存在人力资本投资和第二期工资不确定性。研究发现,比例工资税优于一次性总付税,且社会最优人力资本水平高于个人选择水平;利息所得税可能通过鼓励人力资本投资来提高福利,即使存在最优工资税,正利息所得税率也可能是最优的。

Abstract

Optimal taxation in a two-period model with human-capital investment and second-period wage uncertainty is analyzed. A proportional tax on wages dominates lump-sum taxation and the socially-optimal level of human capital exceeds that which individuals choose. A tax on interest income may raise welfare by encouraging investment in human capital. The interest-income tax reduces the difference between returns to physical and human capital from individuals' inability to reduce human-capital risk through diversification. A positive interest-income tax rate may therefore be optimal, even with an optimal wage tax, by encouraging m ore investment in human capital. Copyright 1987 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

最优工资税最优利息税人力资本投资工资不确定性