Costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees
构建了一个模型，研究参与成本高且成员政策偏好不同时，信息委员会的最优规模。发现偏好异质性在成本足够高时能激励成员收集信息，从而提升委员会规模和委托人的预期收益。
Informational committees are groups of people who are designated to gather information. This article develops a simple model of committee size based on costly participation and preference heterogeneity. In a setting in which the information structure and policy preferences are both represented by normal random variables, I characterize an equilibrium under the mean decision rule and derive the optimal committee size. I show that when effort costs are sufficiently high, preference heterogeneity can provide members additional incentives to gather information, and thus the optimal committee size and the principal's expected payoff can increase in the heterogeneity of committee members' policy preferences.