Optimal Progressive Labor Income Taxation and Education Subsidies When Education Decisions and Intergenerational Transfers are Endogenous
在一个包含内生人力资本形成、借贷约束、收入风险和不完全金融市场的模型中，量化分析了最优的累进所得税与教育补贴组合，发现福利最大化的财政政策要求比美国现状更高的累进税率和大学教育补贴。
We quantitatively characterize the optimal mix of progressive income taxes and education subsidies in a model with endogenous human capital formation, borrowing constraints, income risk and incomplete financial markets. In addition to the distortions of labor supply, progressive taxes weaken the incentives to acquire education. The latter distortion can potentially be mitigated by an education subsidy. We find that the welfare-maximizing fiscal policy is indeed characterized by a substantially progressive labor income tax code and a positive subsidy for college education. Both the degree of tax progressivity and the education subsidy are larger than in the current US status quo.