Liquidity, Banking, and Bank Failures
构建了一个多期模型，研究在分散资本交易中出现的流动性问题，银行通过存款合约和债务缓解该问题，并分析银行倒闭与流动性需求、产出和福利的关系，认为政府干预不可取。
A multiperiod model with risk-neutral agents is constructed in which a liquidity problem arises in an equilibrium with decentralized tradin g in capital, which banking institutions are able to alleviate. Depos it contracts provide for early withdrawal, banks hold debt, and agent s who borrow from banks hold compensating balances. Institutional col lapse, or a state of the world when bank failures are experienced, is associated with a high demand for liquidity, low output, and a lower than average level of welfare. Bank failure is symptomatic of a part icular state of endowments, preferences, and technology, and governme nt intervention is undesirable. Copyright 1988 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.