SPATIAL COMPETITION À LA COURNOT: PRICE DISCRIMINATION BY QUANTITY‐SETTING OLIGOPOLISTS*
研究了空间模型中寡头企业通过独立设定数量计划进行价格歧视的竞争，证明纳什均衡存在且唯一，市场重叠，并预测线性运输成本下统一交货定价。
ABSTRACT In this paper, we consider oligopolistic competition in a spatial model when firms take care of goods' delivery and discriminate among consumers. Firms compete by setting quantity schedules independently over space. We show that under general conditions a Nash equilibrium in this game exists and is unique. In equilibrium, firms’ markets overlap, a feature which accords with intuition and empirical observations. Over the interval between two firms, the equilibrium spatial price schedule is quasi‐concave (quasi‐convex) when transport costs are concave (convex). With linear transport costs, the model predicts uniform delivered pricing. Uniform pricing could moreover be obtained by a combination of increasing returns to volume in transportation together with concavity of unit transport costs in distance.