Search and the Efficient Assignment of Workers to Jobs
推导了工人和岗位机会成本的计算方法，发现其与保留工资和利润存在系统性差异，导致劳动力市场出现外部性和无效配置，干预可提高总产出但可能引起倒退性再分配。
In a model in which different types of workers form matches with different types of employers, a method of calculating opportunity costs of workers and jobs is derived. These are shown to differ systematically from the reservation wages and profits used by workers and employers to determine whether matches should be formed. Ex ante differences among workers and among jobs then generate externalities in the labor market, resulting in inefficient assignments of workers to jobs and multiple equilibria. Intervention in the labor market, by altering the assignment, can increase aggregate output but may cause regressive redistribution. Copyright 1995 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.