International and Intergenerational Environmental Externalities
研究了各国政策制定者的行动对全球环境这一共同资源的长期影响，分析了跨国、跨时间不合作时的资源配置，发现即时合作可能损害后代利益。
We examine a world in which policymakers' actions in a given country at a given time have long‐lived effects on a common resource: the global environment. We consider the first best in which long‐lived planners behave cooperatively, then examine the allocation of resources when there is non‐cooperation across countries, across time, or both. Finally we analyze the dynamic behavior of the economy along balanced growth paths. It is found that while long‐lived international institutions are necessary to internalize all externalities, cooperation at a point in time may be harmful to future generations.