Promoting Safety Through Workers' Compensation: The Efficacy and Net Wage Costs of Injury Insurance
利用1982年收入动态面板研究和国家职业安全与健康研究所的新职业死亡数据，分析工伤保险对死亡率与工资的影响，发现保费的安全激励效应抵消了道德风险，若无保险死亡率将上升超20%。
This article explores the effects of workers' compensation on fatality rates and wages using the 1982 Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the new occupationalfatality data issued by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.The fatality rate depends upon the workers' compensation benefit variables in a manner that suggests that the safety incentive effects of higher insurance premiums offset any moral hazard effects.The estimates imply that in the absence of workers' compensation, fatality rates would increase by over 20%.Premium levels substantially overstate the cost of workers' compensation, due primarily to a direct wage offset from higher benefits.An indirect wage offset resulting from the decrease in risk caused by workers' compensation augments the direct wage effects.The indirect ofset is relatively small, equalling about 10% of the total. Introduction* The fundamental interdependence of job risks and wages has been a focal point of the labor economics literature dealing with nonpecuniary job characteristics.Higher levels of risk cause workers to demand higher wages, and these wage-risk trade-offs, in turn, establish market incentives for safety.'The introduction of workers' compensation establishes an additional dimension.Higher levels of workers' compensation benefits should dampen the wage premiums for risk demanded by the workers, and the funding mechanism for workers' compensation should provide incentives for safety.2