Licensing to Enhance Demand for New Technologies
建立模型说明，即使许可增加行业成本，许可竞争对手也可能扩大新专利产品的需求，成为利润最大化的策略。模型基于买家关注价格和质量、卖家可约定价格但无法约定质量、单一供应商拥有垄断权力的设定。
This article presents a model in which licensing competitors expands demand for a new proprietary product and, therefore, may be a profit-maximizing strategy for the licensor even when licensing increases industry cost. In the model buyers care about price and quality, sellers can contract on price but not on quality, and a single supplier has monopoly power. Licensing induces quality competition and allows the supplying firms to make a quality commitment that would not be credible for a single firm. As a result, licensing increases industry demand and may generate an increase in industry revenue sufficient to offset any increase in industry cost. Some of the characteristics of the model are informed by observations in the semiconductor industry.