The Design of an Efficient Private Industry
研究政府拍卖生产权（如牌照拍卖、私有化）能否塑造高效产业结构，发现当企业同时拥有固定成本和边际成本的私有信息时，不存在能实现最优产业结构的机制，且次优产业结构可能比最优更竞争或更垄断。
Government-sponsored auctions for production rights (e.g., license auctions, privatizations, etc.) shape the industry structure. Are there mechanisms that induce an efficient industry structure (at least when there are no positive costs to public funds)? The answer is “no” whenever firms have private information about both fixed and marginal costs. Our analysis also suggests that the second-best industry may either be more competitive or more monopolistic than the first-best one. These insights are in sharp contrast with the ones obtained for models where firms have one-dimensional private information, thus requiring more delicate policy recommendations.