A Theory of Financing Constraints and Firm Dynamics
构建了一个多期借贷模型，证明最优长期合同会产生融资约束，且约束随企业未来现金流价值增加而放松，模型预测企业增长均值和方差随年龄和规模下降、生存率上升，与实证一致。
There is widespread evidence supporting the conjecture that borrowing constraints have important implications for firm growth and survival. In this paper we model a multiperiod borrowing/lending relationship with asymmetric information. We show that borrowing constraints emerge as a feature of the optimal long-term lending contract, and that such constraints relax as the value of the borrower's claim to future cash flows increases. We also show that the optimal contract has interesting implications for firm dynamics. In agreement with the empirical evidence, as age and size increase, mean and variance of growth decrease, and firm survival increases.