Share Repurchase Mechanisms: A Comparative Analysis of Efficacy, Shareholder Wealth, and Corporate Control Effects
比较了荷兰式拍卖和可转让看跌权（TPR）两种股票回购机制与传统固定价格要约回购在效率、财富转移和公司控制方面的差异，发现两者均能减少低效投标的损失，且荷兰式拍卖在效率和反收购方面更具优势。
This paper compares the dutch auction and transferable put rights (TPRs) share repurchase mechanisms to the traditional fixed-price tender offer in terms of efficiency, wealth transfers, and corporate control. Using Monte Carlo simulations, it is shown that both alternative mechanisms reduce the deadweight losses from inefficient tendering by ensuring that shareholders with the lowest reservation prices are bought out first. The TPR mechanism is further distinguished because it provides greater wealth gains to nontendering and smaller gains to exiting shareholders. The dutch auction mechanism has an efficiency advantage over the TPR because it can be designed to eliminate the possibility of undersubscription and, furthermore, is also a more effective takeover deterrent.