Commitment and Conflict in Bilateral Bargaining
研究双边谈判中低成本承诺对结果的影响，发现承诺成本为零或正时，迭代严格占优策略会导致冲突或一方独占剩余，对博弈论和谈判研究者有参考价值。
Building on previous work by Schelling and Crawford, we study a model of bilateral bargaining in which negotiators can make binding commitments at a low positive cost c. Most of our results concern outcomes that survive iterated strict dominance. If commitment attempts never fail, there are three such outcomes. In two of them, all the surplus goes to one player. In the third, there is a high probability of conflict. If commitment attempts succeed with probability q < 1, the unique outcome that survives iterated strict dominance entails conflict with probability q2. When c = 0, analogous results hold if the requirement of iterated strict dominance is replaced by iterated weak dominance.