Shareholder Goals, Firm Goals and Firm Financing Decisions
对比股东导向与管理导向的财务理论，聚焦美国大公司管理层薪酬安排，基于代理理论提出不同于股东模型的融资与投资决策假设，为资本结构研究提供可检验的新视角。
nancial behavior based on a shareholder perspective and those based on a management perspective. Following a review of the two main lines of financial structure theory shareholder oriented and management oriented this article focuses on management compensation arrangements in large United States firms. Building on the agency theory work of Jensen and Meckling [I ], it is argued that proper recognition of the relationship between shareholders and managers in these firms leads to predictions of financial structure choices (and capital investment decisions) that differ from the predictions of shareholder oriented models and that are specific enough to serve as testable hypotheses with only weak assumptions about management preferences. Thus, the potential for acquiring new evidence with regard to both capital structure decisions and firm objectives is increased.