External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion
在经济竞赛框架下分析企业选择内部晋升还是外部招聘的权衡：外部招聘会降低现有员工的晋升机会和努力激励，而提高奖励或给予内部员工竞争劣势补偿是可能的应对策略。
This article analyzes the choice between internal promotion and external recruitment within the framework of an economic contest. Opening up the competition for a position to external candidates reduces the chance of promotion for existing workers and therefore their incentive to work. Increasing the prize for winning can maintain incentives but is limited by moral hazard and potentially disruptive office politics. Alternatively, a competitive handicap can be awarded to existing workers to boost their chances. This strategy is consistent with the general observation that an external candidate is recruited only if she is significantly superior to the internal contestants.