Public Information Quality with Monopolistic Sellers
证明，在信息不对称的市场中，即使各方对最优信息质量达成一致，将不可验证的公共信息质量选择权交给从信息中获益的交易者会导致效率损失；而委托给不参与交易利润的独立代理人则能实现有效实施，为美国财务会计准则委员会等制度安排提供了博弈论解释。
We show that in markets with asymmetric information, even if there is full agreement on the choice of optimal information quality, entrusting the choice of (unverifiable) public information quality to traders who benefit from such information leads to inefficiencies. However, delegation of information quality choice to an independent agent who is precluded from sharing in trading profits results in efficient implementation. This result provides a game-theoretic rationale for current institutional arrangements where a private organization that is independent of market traders, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, determines the standards for public disclosures.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D41, D42, D82.