Information Disclosure to Employees and Rational Expectations: A Game‐Theoretical Perspective
分析企业经理在信息同时影响金融市场估值和工会工资谈判时的自愿披露策略，发现完全披露和不披露均衡都可能存在，与早期研究结论相悖。
This paper analyses the voluntary disclosure strategies of a privately informed firm manager when the information is relevant to both a financial market for valuation purposes and a union for wage bargaining purposes. Disclosure of favourable information may adversely affect the terms under which the firm can secure the required flow of labour and may thus lead to a decrease in the firm's market value. The paper shows that both a full‐disclosure and a nondisclosure equilibrium may exist, which contradicts an earlier analysis of the issue made by Pope and Peel (1981).