Institution design and public good provision: an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure
实验研究了议会信任投票程序对公共品供给的影响，发现该程序虽能增强多数党投票凝聚力，但导致公共品供给减少23%且更偏向专项项目。
Abstract Parliamentary democracies use the vote of confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 23 % reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking.