PRODUCT QUALITY, REPUTATION, AND MARKET STRUCTURE*
研究了在重复博弈中企业同时选择价格和产品质量时，寡头市场如何通过声誉损失和默契合谋破裂的威胁维持高质量，并发现可行质量与市场结构呈倒U型关系。
In a repeated game in which firms simultaneously choose price and product quality, but quality is observed only after consumption takes place, equilibria exhibiting high quality may exist in oligopoly markets even when the low-quality one is a unique equilibrium outcome in monopoly and competitive markets. Oligopolists can sustain high quality through the threat of both a loss of reputation and a breakdown in tacit collusion. While we abstract from other reasons that market structure might affect product quality, we show that the inverted-U shaped relationship between feasible quality and market structure is robust to several generalizations of the model.