Persistent Distortionary Policies with Asymmetric Information
解释为何在看似存在帕累托改进时，扭曲政策仍被使用。作者放松了赢家知道输家损失程度的假设，发现信息有效的补偿方式可能涉及看似低效的扭曲政策，因为过度补偿的风险使扭曲在信息上有效。
Why are distortionary policies used when seemingly Pareto improvements exist? According to a standard textbook argument, a Pareto improvement can be obtained by eliminating the distortions, compensating the losers with a lump sum transfer, and redistributing the gains that are left over. We relax the assumption that winners know the losses suffered by the losers and show that the informationally efficient method of compensating losers may involve the use of seemingly inefficient (but informationally efficient) distortionary policies. The risk of overcompensating losers may make distortions informationally efficient, as there are points on the Pareto frontier where distortions are used.