The Sensitivity of Corporate Cash Holdings to Corporate Governance
研究中国股权分置改革后上市公司现金持有量下降的现象，发现治理较差和融资受限的公司降幅更大，改革通过改善激励和放松融资约束降低了企业储蓄率。
The average cash holdings of Chinese-listed firms decreased significantly after the split share structure reform in China, which specified a process that allowed previously nontradable shares held by controlling shareholders to be freely tradable on the exchanges. The reduction in cash holdings is greater for firms with weaker governance and firms facing more financial constraints prior to the reform. The reform also significantly reduced the average corporate savings rate, as measured by cash-to-cash-flow sensitivity. These findings are consistent with the premise that the reform removed a significant market friction, which led to better incentive alignment between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and relaxed financial constraints. Additional analyses show that the reform affects firms' cash management policies, investment decisions, dividend payout policies, and financing choices differently in private firms than in state-owned enterprises. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.