Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information
建立了一个不完全信息下当事人诉讼与和解决策的模型，分析信息不对称如何影响和解可能性和和解金额，并考察诉讼成本、争议金额及法律规则（如诉讼费用分配规则）的作用。
A model of parties' litigation and settlement decisions under imperfect information is studied. The model shows how informational asymmetry influences parties' decisions, and how it might lead to parties' failure to settle. The model is used to identify how the likelihood of settlement and the settlement amount are shaped by various factors--the size of the amount at stake, the magnitude of the parties' litigation costs, and the nature of the parties' information. The model is also used to examine how the likelihood of settlement is affected by various legal rules, such as those governing the allocation of litigation costs.