Manipulation of Social Program Eligibility
研究了社会福利项目瞄准系统如何随时间被操作，发现地方官员在选举前操纵家庭访谈时间，并在获知评分算法后出现资格阈值附近的分数密度突变，选举竞争越激烈操纵越严重。
We document how manipulation of a targeting system for social welfare programs evolves over time. First, there was strategic behavior of some local politicians in the timing of the household interviews around local elections. Then, there was corrupt behavior with the sudden emergence of a sharp discontinuity in the score density, exactly at the eligibility threshold, which coincided with the release of the score algorithm to local officials. The discontinuity at the threshold is larger where mayoral elections are more competitive. While cultural forces are surely relevant for corruption, our results also highlight the importance of information and incentives..