Turnpike Properties in a Finite-Horizon Differential Game: Dynamic Duopoly with Sticky Prices
分析了一个有限时域动态双寡头模型，其中市场价格不会随供给量瞬时调整。作者完整分析了带控制约束的有限时域线性二次微分博弈的反馈纳什均衡，发现两条均衡价格路径在除初始和最终时刻外都接近无限时域全局渐近稳定的稳态均衡。
The authors study the equilibrium price paths of a finite-horizon dynamic duopoly model in which the market price does not have to adjust instantaneously in response to changes in the quantity supplied. A complete analysis of the feedback Nash equilibrium of a finite-horizon linear quadratic differential game with a control constraint is presented. Two equilibrium price paths are identified and it is shown that they both remain close to the infinite-horizon, globally asymptotically stable, stationary equilibrium except for some initial and final time. Copyright 1990 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.