Immobility, Rationing and Price Competition
研究企业公布价格后，买家通过非合作搜索游戏争取商品，企业因边际成本上升可能不愿按公布价格供应全部需求，均衡中必然出现配给，并刻画了配给概率为1时的均衡价格和产量。
A model is studied where firms advertise prices and buyers play a noncooperative search game in an attempt to secure output from firms at the advertised prices. Firms face rising marginal costs and may not be willing to supply everything demanded at their price if they wind up with many buyers. It is shown that rationing will occur in equilibrium no matter how averse buyers are to this possibility. The result is specialised to a case where rationing occurs with probability one. The equilibrium price and outputs are characterised for this case.