The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives
比较赢者通吃和比例代表制下政治家提供公共品的动机，发现当公共品特别受欢迎时，赢者通吃制下供给不足更严重，并指出选举人团制度尤其容易导致这种低效率。
Politicians who care about the spoils of office may underprovide a public good because its benefits cannot be targeted to voters as easily as pork-barrel spending. We compare a winner-take-all system—where all the spoils go to the winner—to a proportional system—where the spoils of office are split among candidates proportionally to their share of the vote. In a winner-take-all system the public good is provided less often than in a proportional system when the public good is particularly desirable. We then consider the electoral college system and show that it is particularly subject to this inefficiency.